

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 AEC-05 CIAE-00 EUR-08 H-01 INR-05 IO-04 L-02

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SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 ISO-00

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: WG AERIAL INSPECTION PAPER

REF: NATO 5339

1. WE REGRET DELAY IN SUBMITTING COMMENTS ON REVISED
DRAFT. WE HAVE GIVEN PAPER CLOSE REVIEW, WITH SPECIAL
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ATTENTION TO POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF ANY AERIAL INSPECTION
PROPOSAL PRESENTED TO SOVIETS IN MBFR ON OTHER, RELATED,
US AND ALLIED INTERESTS IN WESTERN EUROPE. AS THE
RESULT OF OUR REVIEW WE WISH TO PROPOSE THE CHANGES

DESCRIBED BELOW. (A MORE DETAILED EXPLANATION ON FYI BASIS BEING FORWARDED SEPTTEL).

2. THE ALLIES WILL NOTE THAT OUR AMENDMENTS RESULT IN THE ELIMINATION OF REFERENCE TO ALTITUDE 4,000-10,000 FEET FOR AIRBORNE INSPECTION AND TO POSSIBLE USE OF IMAGING RADAR. WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ALL OPTIONS CONCERNING AIRBORNE VERIFICATION BE KEPT OPEN AT THIS TIME AND EXPRESSION OF PREFERENCE FOR SPECIFIC OPERATING ALTITUDE CEILINGS COULD TEND TO CLOSE THEM. WE HAVE PROPOSED DELETION OF REFERENCE TO THE POTENTIAL USE OF ACTIVE SENSORS SUCH AS IMAGING RADAR WHICH COULD PREJUDICE FUTURE UNILATERAL USE OF RADAR BY ALLIES IN, FOR EXAMPLE, PERIPHERAL MISSIONS, IF THE EAST TOOK EXCEPTION TO ACTIVE SENSORS IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

3. THE FOLLOWING DELETIONS AND CHANGES SHOULD BE INCORPORATED IN THE DRAFT IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CONCERNS AS WELL AS IN ORDER TO CLARIFY AMBIGUITIES, REMOVE CONJECTURE, AND FOCUS ON KEY PROBLEM AREAS. ALL CHANGES ARE KEYED TO THE PARAGRAPHS OF REFTTEL.

4. PARA 5A(3): THE CAPABILITIES OF INFRARED TO DETECT SUB-SURFACE FEATURES AND PROVIDE INFORMATION ON BUILDING UTILIZATION ARE SEPARATE FROM ITS CAMOUFLAGE PENETRATION CAPABILITIES. WE SUGGEST A PERIOD AFTER "BUILDINGS" AND DELETION OF "BECAUSE."

5. PARA 5B(1): DELETE FIRST SENTENCE BECAUSE OF CONSIDERATION IN PARA 2 ABOVE.

6. PARA 5B(8): THE TIME NEEDED FOR AN AERIAL INSPECTION SYSTEM TO BUILD A DATA BASE DEPENDS ON THE FREQUENCY AND EXTENT OF FLIGHTS (AND ON WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM EACH PARTICULAR OBSERVATION), AND IT COULD BE LONGER THAN SIX MONTHS. SUGGEST SUBSTITUTING "THE TIME REQUIRED TO DERIVE AN ADEQUATE DATA BASE
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DEPENDS PRIMARILY ON THE FREQUENCY AND EXTENT OF FLIGHTS NEGOTIATED, AND AT THE VERY BEST WOULD PROBABLY REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE TIME" FOR THE CLAUSE BEGINNING "THIS MIGHT."

7. PARA 5B: GIVEN TIME, MANY VIOLATIONS (SUCH AS ILLEGAL ENTRIES) CAN BE EFFECTIVELY CONCEALED. ADD AS A SUBPARA 9 THE SEPARATE POINT "THE AMOUNT OF ADVANCE NOTIFICATION TO THE OTHER SIDE OF TIME AND ROUTING OF FLIGHTS THAT IS REQUIRED."

8. PARA 6A(1) AND 6A(2): ADD "OR OTHER SOURCES" AFTER "MOBILE GROUND TEAMS" IN BOTH SUBPARAS.

9. PARA 6B: LAST SENTENCE APPEARS TO BE MISSING SOME WORDS.

10. PARA 6A(4): SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING FOR THE ENTIRE PARAGRAPH: "DEPENDING ON THE PREVAILING OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS, WILL HAVE SOME DETERRENT EFFECT ON VIOLATIONS." THE DETERRENT EFFECT WILL BE DIRECTLY PROPORTIONAL TO THE FREEDOM OF OPERATION NEGOTIATED.

11. PARA 7A: SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING FOR PARAGRAPH A FOR THE REASON CITED IN PARA 2 ABOVE AND TO CORRECT TECHNICAL ERROR CHARACTERIZING IR AS "ELECTRONIC." "IN

ADDITION TO THE VARIOUS TECHNIQUES OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY, INCLUDING MULTISPECTRAL BLACK AND WHITE, COLOR AND IR/ COLOR PHOTOGRAPHY, INFRARED SENSORS MAY ALSO BE USEFUL AND ARE AVAILABLE."

12. PARA 7B: DELETE PER PARA 2 ABOVE.

13. PARA 7C: AS INTRUSIVENESS IS IN THE POLITICAL EYE OF THE BEHOLDER, WE SUGGEST DROPPING THE FINAL PHRASE FROM "AND WOULD BE" AND SUBSTITUTING THE TECHNICAL OBSERVATION "FOR COMPARABLE LEVELS OF EFFORT EXPENDED." DELETE "MEDIUM LEVEL" IN SECOND SENTENCE AS PER PARA 2.

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14. PARA 7D: SUGGEST DROPPING THE INTRUSIVE SENTENCE.

15. DELETE ENTIRE PARA 7E BEGINNING "IF ADVERSARY AIRCRAFT" AND ENDING "SATELLITE PRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHS" BECAUSE IT MERELY REPEATS POINTS PREVIOUSLY MADE.

16. PARA 8: CHANGE LAST PART OF SECOND SENTENCE TO READ: "THE CONSIDERATION ON PROVISION OF AIRCRAFT CREWS, INSPECTORS, AND OBSERVERS ARE VERY SIMILAR WHATEVER THE TYPE OF SENSOR CARRIED." RATIONALE AS GIVEN IN PARA 2 ABOVE.

17. PARA 9A: SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING: "MANY TYPES OF AIRCRAFT HAVE THE REQUIRED SIZE, FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS AND RANGE OF OPERATING ALTITUDES WHICH WOULD MAKE THEM USEFUL PLATFORMS FOR CARRYING OUT NEGOTIATED AERIAL INSPECTION MISSIONS. THE ACTUAL HEIGHT ENVELOPE TO BE CHOSEN BY THE INSPECTING NATION OR TO BE NEGOTIATED SHOULD BE RESTRICTED ONLY BY CONSIDERATION OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, AIR SAFETY, AND POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY. WITHIN THESE LIMITS, THE OPERATING ALTITUDE SHOULD BE CHOSEN ON THE BASIS OF OPERATING

EFFICIENCY AND MAXIMUM ACCESS TO THE AREAS AND SITES TO BE MONITORED."

18. PARA 9B: SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING IN LINE WITH PARAS 2 AND 17 ABOVE: "THE AIRCRAFT WOULD HAVE TO BE MODIFIED FOR PHOTOGRAPHIC MISSIONS WITH APPROPRIATE CAMERA MOUNTS, WINDOWS, OPENINGS IN THE FUSELAGE, ETC. IT MUST BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE POWER TO THE SENSORS FOR OPERATION AND CONTROL AND MUST BE LARGE ENOUGH TO ACCOMMODATE IN ADDITION TO THE CREW THE OPERATOR(S) AND OTHER ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL SUCH AS MEMBERS OF THE INSPECTORATE AND ANY HOST COUNTRY REPRESENTATIVES. AIRCRAFT ESPECIALLY DESIGNED OR MODIFIED FOR AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND/OR MAPPING WOULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL."

19. IN NOTE TO PARA 9C DELETE "MUCH" FROM SECOND SENTENCE AND BEGIN THIRD SENTENCE WITH "AN ILLUSTRATIVE" SO AS NOT TO PREJUDGE WHAT AN ACTUAL SITUATION MIGHT REQUIRE.

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20. PARA 9G: DELETE THE ENTIRE PARAGRAPH AS WE BELIEVE THIS QUESTION WOULD REQUIRE SPECIFIC EXAMINATION.

21. PARA 9H: SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING FOR THIS PARAGRAPH (SEE PARA 2) "IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL PROBLEMS AND TO ASSURE THAT THE PLANNED AND APPROVED ROUTE IS BEING ADHERED TO, THE AIRCRAFT MAY HAVE TO FLY UNDER POSITIVE RADAR CONTROL OF THE HOST COUNTRY."

22. PARA 10, OPTION 1, SUB-PARA 2(3)A: SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING: "WHAT SENSORS SHOULD BE USED AND THEIR INHERENT PERFORMANCE, PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS, OPERATING CONDITION, REQUIRED ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT, AND INSTALLATION CHARACTERISTICS." THE PROBLEM IS NOT SO MUCH SECURITY SENSITIVITY BUT TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES.

23. PARA 10, OPTION 1, SUB-PARA 2(3)C: SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING: "ENSURING CREW IS TRAINED FOR AND EXPERIENCED IN FLYING PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE/MAPPING MISSIONS AND IS ACTUALLY FOLLOWING DESIRED MISSION PROFILE AND FLIGHT PATH."

24. PARA 10, OPTION 1, SUB-PARA 2(3)D: DELETE MATERIAL AFTER "...EQUIPMENT WERE USED", AND SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING: "THE INSPECTORS WOULD HAVE TO BE ABLE TO SELECT THE PHOTOGRAPHIC PARAMETERS, INSURE THEIR BEING PROPERLY IMPLEMENTED IN TERMS OF CAMERA OPERATION, HAVE CONTROL OVER THE FILM BEFORE AND AFTER EXPOSURE IN THE CAMERA, AND BE ABLE TO RECORD ON THIS FILM CERTAIN CALIBRATION AND TEST INFORMATION BEFORE AND

AFTER THE MISSION TO INSURE THAT THE CAMERA PERFORMED AS ADVERTISED BY THE HOST." ALL OF THESE FACTORS ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE POSSIBILITY OF FILM SUBSTITUTION.

25. PARA 10, OPTION 2, SUB-PARA B(3)A: DELETE SENTENCE STARTING WITH "WHILST THE..." AND SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING: "THE INSTALLATION OF ADVERSARY SENSORS IN THE HOST NATION'S AIRCRAFT IS POSSIBLE BUT DIFFICULT IN PRACTICE, ESPECIALLY IF RECONNAISSANCE SENSORS RATHER
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THAN THE WIDELY STANDARDIZED AERIAL MAPPING CAMERAS WERE TO BE USED. THE HOST AIRCRAFT WOULD HAVE TO BE EQUIPPED WITH PROPER MOUNTS, WINDOWS, FUSELAGE OPENINGS, POWER SUPPLIES, ETC. AN ADDITIONAL DIFFICULTY MIGHT BE THE

SECURITY SENSITIVITY IF THE INSPECTING NATION WOULD WISH TO USE HIGH PERFORMANCE, CLASSIFIED AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE SENSORS." WE THINK THE SUBSTITUTE MORE CLEARLY BOUNDS THE PROBLEMS.

26. PARA 10, OPTION 2, SUB-PARA (3)C: SUBSTITUTE ITEM IN PARA 20 ABOVE.

27. PARA 10, OPTION 3, SUB-PARA (3)A: SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING: "ENSURING THAT ONLY AUTHORIZED SENSORS ARE ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT. THIS IS VERY DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT WITH CERTAINTY. UNDOUBTEDLY THE GREATEST RISK TO THE HOST NATION'S SECURITY IS IN THE FIELD OF ELECTRONIC EMISSIONS AND POSITIVE ASSURANCE THAT THE INSPECTING AIRCRAFT IS NOT EQUIPPED WITH CONCEALED MONITORING DEVICES IS AT BEST DIFFICULT AND TIME CONSUMING, AT WORST IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT TAKING THE PLANE ITSELF APART."

28. PARA 12A: DELETE LAST SENTENCE WHICH STARTS WITH "THE PRESENCE OF..." ON BASIS OF PARA 26 ABOVE.

29. PARA 12B: DELETE MATERIAL AFTER "...SOURCE OF FRICTION." WHICH BEGINS WITH "IN ADDITION..." FOR CLARITY, SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING: "IN ADDITION, STEPS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN TO ASCERTAIN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SENSORS AND ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED BY THE HOST COUNTRY TO INSURE THAT THE EQUIPMENT IS ACTUALLY OPERATING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PHOTOGRAPHIC PARAMETERS SELECTED, THAT THE FILM AND OTHER DATA RECORDS NOT BE TAMPERED WITH, AND THAT "ACCIDENTAL" MALFUNCTIONS WILL NOT OCCUR."

30. PARA 12C: DELETE THE LAST PART OF FIRST SENTENCE STARTING WITH "...IF SENSOR EQUIPMENTS..." AND SUBSTITUTE "...IF THE HOST AIRCRAFT ARE SUITABLY

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EQUIPPED FOR AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHIC MISSIONS, IF STANDARD MAPPING CAMERAS ARE USED, OR IF HOST AIRCRAFT ARE SPECIALLY MODIFIED AND EQUIPPED TO ACCEPT NON-STANDARD RECONNAISSANCE CAMERAS WHICH THE INSPECTING NATION WISHES TO USE AND WHICH HAVE BEEN AGREED TO." DELETE THE MIDDLE SENTENCE OF THE PARAGRAPH STARTING WITH "CONTROL OF SENSORS..." PER PARA 2.

31. PARA 13B: AT THE END OF THIS PARAGRAPH, ADD THE FOLLOWING AFTER "...TECHNICAL OR MILITARY PROBLEMS.": "THE AMOUNT OF VERIFICATION INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL DEPEND CRITICALLY ON WHAT DETAILED RULES ARE NEGOTIATED."

32. PARA 15B(2): DELETE THIS PARAGRAPH PER PARA 2 ABOVE.

33. PARA 15(4)C: DELETE THE END OF THE FIRST SENTENCE BEGINNING WITH "... AND SHOULD BE A PRACTICAL..." PERIOD AFTER "OPTIONS." WE SEE TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THIS OPTION PER PARA 24 ABOVE.

34. PARA 15D: DELETE THIS PARAGRAPH AND SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING: "SINCE THE POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF AERIAL INSPECTION IS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE, IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT THAT THE TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF AIRBORNE INSPECTION BE FORMULATED SUCH THAT THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO VERIFICATION IS READILY UNDERSTOOD WHEN THE PROS AND CONS OF SPECIFIC DESIRABLE NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES ARE EVALUATED. SPECIFICALLY, MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE OPERATING RESTRICTIONS (E.G. PRESCRIBED PRIOR NOTIFICATION, PERMITTED FLIGHT PATH, ALTITUDE, FREQUENCY OF COVERAGE, ETC.) BEYOND WHICH AIRBORNE INSPECTION WOULD CONTRIBUTE VERY LITTLE TO MONITORING OR TO FILLING INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND WOULD HAVE NO DETERRENT EFFECT ON VIOLATIONS MUST BE UNDERSTOOD BEFORE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS ARE DEVELOPED." WE THINK THIS CHANGE WILL SERVE TO USEFULLY FOCUS ANY FOLLOW-ON STUDIES OF SPECIFIC AERIAL INSPECTION SCHEMES AND FLAG FOR THE SPC THE NECESSITY TO RESOLVE THESE TECHNICAL QUESTIONS IN ADVANCE OF MAKING ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSAL IN VIENNA.

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35. SUMMARY OF U.S. PAPER, PARA 6D: SUBSTITUTE "BUT" FOR "BOTH." INGERSOLL

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Message Attributes

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